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ABSTRACT
This article evaluates the legal basis for a state duty to
cooperate with atrocity inquiries within the United Nations (“UN”).
The conventional understanding is that such duty only exists
pursuant to a Security Council decision. Through examination of
General Assembly practice in monitoring state cooperation with
atrocity inquiries, this article considers whether there is a basis for
cooperation to be constructed as a primary obligation under the UN
Charter. It considers the extent to which the text of the UN Charter
and other sources of international law support a reasonable
interpretive claim that a duty to cooperate with UN atrocity inquiries
exists. While practice is inconsistent, the article shows there to be
seeds from which the General Assembly could, in a “declaration,”
confirm an understanding that state cooperation with UN atrocity
inquiries is obligatory.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The United Nations (“UN”) has an extensive practice of
creating fact-finding bodies to inquire into atrocity situations
(those concerning alleged commission of war crimes, crimes
against humanity, genocide, and other systematic human rights
violations).1 These “atrocity inquiries,” as they are termed here, are
tasked with establishing facts and determining the occurrence of
international crimes (genocide, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity) and serious violations of international human rights
law.2 Although inquiries have become an important feature of the
UN’s mandate to secure accountability for atrocities, they rely to a
significant extent upon the cooperation of states to gather
necessary information. “Cooperation” in this respect connotates
various features.3 The Darfur inquiry set out six criteria to
determine the degree to which a state has successfully cooperated
with an atrocity inquiry: (i) freedom of movement for members of
the atrocity inquiry throughout the territory where the alleged
violations have occurred; (ii) unfettered access to witnesses and
1. There is a growing scholarly literature on these developments. See, e.g., Ginevra
Le Moli, From “Is” to “Ought”: The Development of Normative Powers of UN Investigative
Mechanisms, CHIN. J. INT’L L. (2021); Michael Becker & Sarah Nouwen, International
Commissions of Inquiry: What Difference Do They Make? Taking an Empirical Approach,
30(3) EUR. J. INT’L L. 819 (2019); Hala Khoury-Bisharat, The Unintended Consequences of the
Goldstone Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights Organizations in Israel, 30(3) EUR. J. INT’L
L. 877 (2019); Eliav Lieblich, At Least Something: The UN Special Committee on the Problem
of Hungary, 1957-1958, 30(3) EUR. J. INT’L L. 843 (2019); Larissa Van den Herik, An Inquiry
into the Role of Commissions of Inquiry in International Law: Navigating the Tensions
between Fact-Finding and Application of International Law, 13 CHIN. J. INT’L L. 507 (2014).
2. Other descriptions of atrocity inquiries in the UN system include “commissions of
inquiry”, “fact-finding missions”, “panel of experts”, or “commission of experts”. See U.N.
OHCHR, Commissions of Inquiry and Fact-Finding Missions on International Human Rights
and
Humanitarian
Law:
Guidance
and
Practice
7
(2015),
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/CoI_Guidance_and_Practice.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P66D-TGY2]. For brevity, “atrocity inquiry” is used here.
3. Scholars have defined cooperation more generally in international relations as
“the voluntary coordinated action of two or more States which takes place under a legal
regime and serves a specific objective”: Rüdiger Wolfrum, International Law of
Cooperation, in MAX PLANCK ENCYC. PUB. INT’L L. ¶ 2 (Apr. 2010). Space precludes a detailed
exposition of this general use, the focus here being on its specific development within the
framework of the UN system in the context of atrocity crime inquiries.
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places/establishments; (iii) free access to all sources of
information, including documentary material and physical
evidence; (iv) appropriate security arrangements for the
personnel and documents of the atrocity inquiry; (v) protection of
victims and witnesses and all those who appear before the inquiry;
and (vi) privileges, immunities and facilities necessary for the
independent conduct of the inquiry.4
The conventional understanding of UN atrocity inquiries is
that there is no obligation to cooperate in these ways unless
required by a Security Council decision.5 To this understanding,
there exists no primary obligation under the UN Charter to
cooperate with inquiries generally. This understanding has
implications for inquiries that are not supported by a Security
Council decision, particularly those established by the General
Assembly or Human Rights Council which operate without the
consent of the territorial state concerned.6 A lack of cooperation
has not stopped inquiries from producing final reports.7 Still,
cooperation will often be the single most important factor in
ensuring that the mandate of an atrocity inquiry is fulfilled.8 A
4. Rep. of the Comm’n Inquiry Darfur to U.N. Secretary-General., ¶ 28 (Jan. 25, 2005).
5. U.N. Charter, arts. 25 & 48; Anne-Marie Devereux, Investigating Violations of
International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law through an
International Commission of Inquiry: Libya and Beyond, in INVESTIGATING OPERATIONAL
INCIDENTS IN A MILITARY CONTEXT: LAW, JUSTICE, POLITICS 114 (2015) (David Lovell ed., 2015).
The Security Council has also required cooperation with non-Chapter VII established
atrocity inquiries: S.C. Res. 1636 ¶ 11 (Oct. 31, 2005). Security Council members have
called on Burundi to cooperate with the Human Rights Council’s Burundi Commission:
Press Release, U.N. Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on Situation in
Burundi’,
SC/12750
(Mar.
13,
2017),
http://www.un.org/press/en/2017/sc12750.doc.htm [https://perma.cc/LE9E-R2D3].
6. By contrast, inquiries established by the Secretary-General have been with the
consent of the territorial State concerned and have enjoyed greater instances of
cooperation: Steven Ratner, After Atrocity: Optimizing UN Action Toward Accountability for
Human Rights Abuses, 36(3) MICH. J. INT’L L. 541, 551 (2015).
7. See, e.g., the inquiry reports relied on in: Application of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Gambia v Myanmar), Order 2020,
I.C.J. 178 (Jan. 23 2020), https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/178/17820200123-ORD-02-00-EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/CE67-UHLC]; see also OHCHR,
Commissions of Inquiry and Fact-Finding Missions on International Human Rights and
Humanitarian Law: Guidance and Practice 65 (“[L]ack of cooperation from the authorities
has not prevented investigations and fact-finding from taking place nor
commissions/missions from reaching conclusions”).
8. See, e.g., Human Rts. Comm., Rep. of the Comm. of Inquiry on Human Rights, Eritrea,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/29/42, at ¶ 82 (2015) (the lack of access is a “great concern” and
impediment to an effective inquiry). Non-cooperation is a longstanding problem: Frances
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failure of cooperation may constrain the workings of an inquiry, in
that the quality and reliability of inquiry reports will often turn
upon the extent to which the territorial State provides access to the
inquiry.9 Even if an inquiry can conduct interviews with witnesses
remotely or outside of the territory concerned, the lack of the
cooperation of persons implicated can affect the extent to which
exculpatory evidence, on the one hand, and proof of their intention,
on the other, is acquired.10 Drawing conclusions based upon an
incomplete evidentiary record can also compromise the
independence of an inquiry in the eyes of some international
publics, who may perceive the inquiry to have crossed the line into
advocacy over fair adjudication.11 At the very least, it opens up
inquiries to criticism that their conclusions do not reflect the
realities on the ground.
Despite the importance of cooperation to the fulfilment of
inquiry mandates, scholars have not paid attention to the basis for
fashioning a cooperation duty within the UN system; the need for
this to be voluntarily obtained, outside of a Security Council
decision, has been assumed. Instead, scholars have tended to focus
on procedural fairness issues and the effects of inquiry reports
both on international institutions and in the country under
investigation. Some of these studies have shown atrocity inquiry
reports to have exerted influence on international and domestic
Trix, Peace-Mongering in 1913: The Carnegie Commission of Inquiry and Its Report on the
Balkan Wars, 5(2) FIRST WORLD WAR STUD. 147, 151-52 (2014).
9. Human Rts. Comm., Rep. of the Detailed Findings of the Independent International
Commission of Inquiry on the Protests in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/40/CRP .2, at ¶¶ 30-31 (Mar. 18, 2019); U.N. G.A., Rep. of the International,
Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of
Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in
the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011, U.N. Doc. A/72/764, at ¶ 1 (Feb. 28, 2018) (“If
relevant information holders choose not to cooperate with the Mechanism, that might
affect its ability to collect evidence and develop case files about associated crimes.”); U.N.
GAOR, 2nd Emergency Special Session, 571st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/PV.571, at ¶ 150 (Nov.
9, 1956).
10. See, e.g., Syria Report, supra note 9, at ¶ 15; Human Rts. Comm., Rep. of the United
Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/12/ 48 (Sep. 25, 2009)
¶¶ 137-45; Human Rts. Comm., Report of the detailed findings of the comm’n of inquiry on
human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/25/CRP .1
(Feb. 7, 2014), at ¶¶ 21, 62, 932, 1086; Eritrea Report, supra note 8, at ¶ 12.
11. See, e.g., Michael Ramsden, Accountability for Crimes Against the Rohingya:
Strategic Litigation in the International Court of Justice, 26 HARVARD NEG. L. REV 153, 170
(2021) (citing a criticism noted by counsel for Myanmar in challenging the veracity of
inquiry reports in support of ICJ provisional measures).
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decision-makers.12 The scholarly literature has also upheld the
basis for the establishment of these inquiries even without the
consent of the states concerned. Given the growing body of
literature on these aspects of atrocity inquiries, it is imperative to
consider the legal nature of the cooperation in this area. This is not
only because scholarly analysis might reveal there to be less
uniformity on this position in state and institutional practice than
has been assumed,13 but also because the development of a
cooperation duty might fit within the broader trend toward the
normalization and “juridification”14 of atrocity inquiries within the
UN system despite sovereigntist objections.15 The notion that
atrocity inquiries can be established without the consent of the
state concerned was itself once a controversial proposition but has
become a generally accepted UN practice. Yet, it is also apparent
that the UN system is organic; it has room to grow, not only where
concerned with the allocation and distribution of institutional
powers, but also in defining the obligations that come with UN
membership.16 In this respect, it is now well established that
obligations under the UN Charter do not derive solely from
Security Council decisions or those, where relevant, of the
International Court of Justice (“ICJ”). Rather, the UN Charter
contains a set of primary obligations that exist independent of the

12. Dapo Akande & Hannah Tonkin, International Commissions of Inquiry: A New
Form of Adjudication?, EJIL:TALK! (Apr. 6, 2012), https://www.ejiltalk.org/internationalcommissions-of-inquiry-a-new-form-of-adjudication/.
13. Further analysis outlined infra has found this to be true.
14. “Juridification” denotes a shift towards commissions performing judicial-like
functions, including the identification and determination (within the scope of their
mandate, at least) of those responsible for violations of international law. This trend is
comprehensively analyzed in CATHERINE HARWOOD, THE ROLES AND FUNCTIONS OF ATROCITYRELATED UNITED NATIONS COMMISSIONS OF INQUIRY IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (2020).
15. Despite these objections, the text of the UN Charter justifies the legality of atrocity
inquiries within the UN system (to facilitate the General Assembly’s recommendations)
and as a form of subsequent/established practice in the interpretation of the Charter.
These legal foundations are explored in detail in Michael Ramsden, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE
IN THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY 183-85 (2021).
16. Ruth Wedgwood, Unilateral Action in the UN System, 11(2) EUR. J INT’L L. 349
(2000); Philippe Sands & Pierre Klein, BOWETT’S LAW OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 454
(2009); Pollux, The Interpretation of the Charter, 23 BRITISH YBK INT’L L. 54, 55 (1946);
Daniel Moeckli & Nigel White, Treaties as ‘Living Instrument’, in CONCEPTUAL AND
CONTEXTUAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE MODERN LAW OF TREATIES (Dino Kritsiotis & Michael
Bowman eds., 2016); Jessica Liang, Modifying the UN Charter through Subsequent Practice:
Prospects for the Charter’s Revitalization, 81 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 1, 1 (2012).
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decisions of competent organs.17 With this framework in mind, the
following Article considers the extent to which the UN Charter, and
institutional practice, supports the claim that there is a general
duty to cooperate with an atrocity inquiry even without a binding
decision of the Security Council.
In framing this issue, it is important to be clear about why
finding a legal obligation in the UN Charter is useful. There are
many instances where States have cooperated with atrocity
inquiries that are not explicated upon any sense of observance
with a legal obligation; cooperation, rather, has aligned with a
state’s self-interest. Within the UN, the Secretary-General’s
creation of inquiries has followed this model; cooperation has been
secured precisely because the state consented to the inquiry.18
Rather, being able to frame cooperation as a legal duty is most
useful for those inquiries established by the General Assembly or
Human Rights Council against the wishes of the relevant state.
There is also a large body of practice of these bodies in exhorting
Members to cooperate with an inquiry; political or moral pressure
of this kind has been noted as a useful tool in promoting
compliance or at least mobilizing shame against recalcitrant
States.19 However, the imperative for cooperation would be
strengthened if it could be framed as a legal obligation. Writers
have noted, for instance, that the Security Council’s adoption of a
binding resolution demanding cooperation with atrocity inquiries
has led to Member State compliance.20 Finding a legal obligation to

17. See, e.g., Advisory Opinion on Human Rights Obligations Under the UN Charter:
Namibia (Advisory Opinion), [1971] I.C.J. Rep 16, 57; ROSALYN HIGGINS ET AL. (eds.),
OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW: UNITED NATIONS 816 (2017); Louis Sohn, The Human
Rights Clauses of the Charter, 12 TEXAS INT’L L. J. 129, 133 (1977).
18. See, e.g., Steven Ratner, After Atrocity: Optimizing UN Action Toward
Accountability for Human Rights Abuses, 36(3) MICH. J. INT’L L. 541, 551 (2015).
19. G.A., 62nd Sess., 76th plen. mtg. at 35, U.N. Doc A/62/PV.76 (Dec. 18, 2007); G.A.,
52nd Session, 71st plen. mtg. at 18, A/52/PV.71 (Dec. 15, 1997). Scholars have also
observed the political pressure deriving from General Assembly recommendations: BLAINE
SLOAN, UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS IN OUR CHANGING WORLD 42 (1992);
CHRISTIAN TOMUSCHAT, HUMAN RIGHTS: BETWEEN IDEALISM AND REALISM 198 (2014).
20. For instance, when the Security Council established the Darfur Commission and
indicated the possibility of sanctions in the event of non-cooperation, the Sudanese
Representative indicated its willingness to continue to cooperate: U.N. SCOR, 49th year,
5040th mtg. at 14, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5040 (Sept. 18, 2004); Patrick Butchard & Christian
Henderson, A Functional Typology of Commissions of Inquiry, in COMMISSIONS OF INQUIRY:
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS (Christian Henderson ed., 2017), at 31; Micaela Frulli, Fact-

2022]

U.N. ATROCITY INQUIRIES

479

cooperate, and a corresponding violation of this obligation, also
augments collective responses: it might justify the General
Assembly or Human Rights Council to publicly denounce the
recalcitrant states under the shadow of law, including to
recommend (as it has on several occasions) voluntary sanctions.21
Establishing such a legal duty would also reinforce the legitimacy
of contentious evidentiary findings, such as where an inquiry
report effectively created a reverse onus on the relevant state
concerned.22
Given the increasingly important role that inquiries perform
in UN responses to atrocities, it is instructive to consider the basis
for framing a legal obligation to cooperate with them in the
future.23 The future is the focus here because, as is readily
acknowledged, there is no general acceptance of a cooperative
duty yet. Nor, for that matter, is such an obligation explicit in the
UN Charter. However, as will be argued, a textual basis exists for
Member States, acting collectively, to assert that such a duty arises
within this legal framework. The UN Charter, as an organic system,
provides procedural latitude for interpretive evolution, as a
manifestation of subsequent “agreement” or “practice,” premised
upon the memberships’ general acceptance.24 That said, Member
States do have varying conceptions of the weight to be placed on
different sources of interpretation, be that the object and purpose
of the Charter (Articles 1 and 2), the text of a particular provision,
or, where appropriate, the implied or inherent powers under the

Finding or Paving the Road to Criminal Justice: Some Reflections on United Nations
Commissions of Inquiry, 10 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1323, 1333 (2012).
21. See e.g. G.A. Res. 69/188 ¶ 8 (Dec. 18, 2014).
22. Michael Nesbitt, Due Process in UN Commissions of Inquiry: A Legal Analysis of the
Procedures of Goldstone’s Gaza Inquiry, 18(1) GERMAN L. J. 127, 179 (2019).
23. As to inquiries that require cooperation outside of the UN system, see: Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts 1977, art. 90, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 4345; Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes 1899, art. 12,
July 29, 1899; Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes 1907,
art. 23, Oct. 18, 1907.
24. See Harwood supra, note 14. See also Christopher Peters, Subsequent Practice and
Established Practice of International Organizations: Two Sides of the Same Coin?, 3(2)
GOETTINGEN J. INT’L L. 617 (2011); Rebecca Barber, Revisiting the Legal Effect of General
Assembly Resolutions: Can an Authorising Competence for the Assembly be Grounded in the
Assembly’s “Established Practice”, “Subsequent Practice” or Customary International Law?,
26 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 9 (2021).
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Charter.25 Where a practice is yet to be established these various
interpretive approaches place some constraints on the scope of
institutional evolution. This Article therefore will test the extent to
which an interpretive claim can be advanced that there is a duty to
cooperate with atrocity inquiries under the UN Charter. In
evaluating practice and the textual foundation for a cooperation
duty, the following Article is divided into two parts.
Part II tracks UN diplomatic exchanges to survey Member
State attitudes toward a cooperation duty. Given that the General
Assembly is the most representative organ, a particular emphasis
will be placed here on its debates and resolutions to discern a
common legal position on a putative cooperation duty. The
assumption underlying the following analysis is that Assembly
resolutions provide evidence as to the content of international law.
Some dispute the prescriptive significance of Assembly
resolutions, although this view is increasingly anachronistic given
the influence that its declarations have had in the identification and
development of international law.26 In this regard, the Assembly
has produced a body of resolutions that have addressed the need
for states to cooperate with atrocity inquiries, including on
“unfettered access,” relevant documentation and appearance of
witnesses.27 This Article will assess the significance of this practice
in the interpretation of the UN Charter.

25. Mahnoush Arsanjani, Are There Limits to The Dynamic Interpretation Of The
Constitution And Statutes Of Ios By The Internal Organs Of Such Organizations? 235 (Institut
de Droit International, 2019). See also the UN Charter based justifications for Uniting for
Peace, a resolution which arguably expands the powers of the General Assembly beyond
those contemplated in the Charter: U.N., Yearbook of the United Nations, 1950, at 183-90;
Michael Ramsden, “Uniting for Peace” in the Age of International Justice, 42 YALE J. INT’L

L 1 (2016).

26. Draft conclusions on subsequent agreements and subsequent practice in relation to
the interpretation of treaties, with commentaries, U.N. Doc. A/73/10 (2018), reprinted in
[2018] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 199 U.N. Doc. A/73/10; G.A. Res. 73/202, annex, conclusion
12(2) Identification of Customary International Law, (Dec. 20, 2018); Rosalyn Higgins, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS
5 (1963); Richard Falk, On the Quasi-Legislative Competence of the General Assembly, 60(4)
AM. J. INT’L L. 782, 782 (1966).
27. G.A. Res. 72/191 ¶ 33 (Dec. 19, 2017); G.A. Res. 67/262, preamble, ¶ 7 (May 15,
2013); G.A. Res. 38/79 (D), ¶ 16 (Dec. 15, 1983) (here, the Assembly did not request that
Israel allow witnesses to appear before the UN mechanism, but did “condemn” their refusal
to permit persons from the occupied territories to so appear). See also G.A. Res. 54/184 ¶
37 (1999) (transfer to the ad hoc tribunals indicted persons).
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Part III will consider the textual legal basis for a general duty
to cooperate with UN atrocity inquiries. An analysis of the
provisions of the UN Charter and their drafting history will
ascertain the extent to which they can support a reasonable
interpretive claim that a cooperation duty exists. Article 2(5) of the
UN Charter demands particular attention, as its requirement that
Member States lend “every assistance” to the UN whenever action
is taken seems to support a cooperation duty by implication.
Another entry point for such a duty includes the requirement that
treaty parties act in good faith, which might extend to cooperating
with atrocity inquiries and the political organs that established
these subsidiary bodies. Finally, this Article considers the basis for
a cooperation duty outside of the UN Charter, including under
human rights treaties and customary international law, which
might be used by UN organs including the General Assembly in
framing the need to cooperate in the future.
II. THE COOPERATION IMPERATIVE IN UN PRACTICE
The focus of this section is to evaluate the cooperation
imperative in the practice of UN atrocity inquiries that have been
established (i) without the consent of the state concerned and (ii)
outside of a binding decision of the Security Council. Given their
extensive practice in establishing such inquiries, the General
Assembly and Human Rights Council will be the focus of analysis
here. Where relevant, use of cooperation norms in other fields
aside from atrocity response will also be considered, particularly
given the General Assembly’s extensive involvement in creating
inquiries into matters such as racial discrimination (as in apartheid
South Africa), self-determination, and peace maintenance.
In the UN’s opening years there were few atrocity inquiries
established without the consent of the relevant State. The General
Assembly’s atrocity crime cooperation exhortations were instead
focused horizontally at inter-State cooperation, as with its 1946
recommendation that all states arrest persons responsible for war
crimes during World War II and send them for prosecution in those
states where the crimes occurred.28 Although the concept of a UN
atrocity inquiry had yet to be born, the Assembly appeared to
regard a Member’s reporting that which is of international concern
28. G.A. Res. 3 (I) (Feb. 13, 1946).

482

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 45:3

to be important, and thus made a “request” to India and South
Africa to report to a future session on the treatment of persons of
Indian origin in South Africa.29 Outside of the atrocity inquiry
context, in 1947 the Assembly saw the value in establishing
subsidiary fact-finding organs in a different sphere: colonial
independence. The Assembly vested the Special Committee for
Palestine with the “widest powers to ascertain and record facts”
and the power to conduct investigations “in Palestine . . . wherever
it may deem useful.”30 The cooperation of the British mandatory
authority was therefore expected or assumed. Similarly, in 1947
the Assembly also created a subsidiary organ to report on
international peace and security, and expressly recognized that an
investigation “shall not be conducted without the consent of the
State or States in whose territory it is to take place,” implying
cooperation to be voluntary.31 The Peace Observation Commission
(POC), established under the Uniting for Peace resolution, likewise
could only operate in a territory with the permission of the
Member State concerned; states were only “recommend[ed]” to
cooperate with the Commission.32 In 1952 this was put in practice
as the Assembly authorized the POC to dispatch observers to the
Balkans “but only to the territory of States consenting thereto.”33
Another significant event in 1952 was the General Assembly’s
creation of the Commission on the Racial Situation in the Union of
South Africa.34 Resolution 616 (A) (1952) referenced cooperation
twice, noting it to be a UN purpose; it “invit[ed]” South Africa to
“extend its full cooperation” with the new Commission.35 That said,
the imperative for cooperation was overshadowed in Assembly
debates over the meaning of interference in Article 2(7) and
whether the Assembly could establish an inquiry against the will of

29. G.A. Res. 44 (I) ¶ 3 (Feb. 13, 1946); see also G.A. Res. 385 (V) ¶ 5 (Nov. 3, 1950)
(“invites” UN members to submit to the Secretary-General all evidence which they now
hold or which may become available in relation to this question).
30. G.A. Res. 106 (S-l) ¶¶ 2, 4 (May 15, 1947).
31. G.A. Res. 111 (II) ¶ 2 (Nov. 13, 1947); G.A., 111th plen. mtg., A/PV.111, at 811
(Nov. 13, 1947).
32. G.A. Res. 377 (V) ¶¶ 3, 5 (Nov. 3, 1950).
33. G.A. Res. 508 (VI) B (Dec. 7, 1951).
34. G.A. Res. 616 (VIII) (A), ¶ 1 (Dec. 5, 1952).
35. Id. at preamble, ¶ 2.
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the state concerned.36 Still these objections did not carry much
momentum—although South Africa, which claimed the
Commission to be ultra vires, declined to allow it to enter its
territory.37 The consequence of South Africa’s failure to cooperate
attracted some attention in Assembly meetings. Brazil considered
South African non-cooperation to be fatal to the Commission’s
continuance, noting it to be “unrealistic to insist on imposing on the
Government of the Union a sort of technical assistance which it
refuses to accept.”38 India took a contrary view, alleging South
Africa’s non-cooperation to “be inconsistent with the spirit and
letter of the Charter.”39 Still, the language in Assembly resolutions
remained timid. In contrast to “deploring” apartheid, the absence
of cooperation was met with “regret” and spurred the “invitation”
of South Africa to reconsider its position.40
The next major event worth more detailed analysis occurred
in 1956 with Russia’s intervention in Hungary, leading the General
Assembly to create an inquiry and adopt a series of resolutions
dealing with cooperation. In the first such resolution, which was
both American drafted and sponsored, the Assembly “call[ed]
upon” the Soviet Union to “permit observers” designated by the
Secretary-General to “enter the territory” to carry out unfettered
investigations.41 It also “called upon” members to cooperate with
the Secretary-General.42 The Secretary-General, in communicating
with the incumbent Hungarian government, referred to the
cooperation “demand of the General Assembly” and the “firm
expectation” that this request “will be accepted.”43 The Assembly
responded to Soviet refusals to cooperate by “urging” them to
36. G.A., 7th Sess., 401st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/PV.401 (Dec. 5, 1952); G.A., 7th Sess.,
381st plen. mtg., at 53-59, U.N. Doc. A/PV.381 (Oct. 17, 1952) (extensive objection by South
Africa to the placing of apartheid on the General Assembly’s agenda).
37. See e.g., G.A., Rep. of the United Nations Commission on the Racial Situation in the
Union of South Africa, U.N. Doc. A/2505 & U.N. Doc. A/2505/Add1 (1953).
38. G.A., 9th Sess., 511th plen. mtg. at 488, U.N. Doc. A/PV.511 (Dec. 14, 1954).
39. Id. at 490.
40. G.A. Res. 721 (VIII), preamble, ¶ 5 (Nov. 27, 1953); see also G.A. Res. 820 (IX), ¶ 2,
4 (Dec. 14, 1954); G.A. Res. 917 (X), ¶ 2 (Dec. 6, 1955); G.A. Res. 1016 (XI), ¶¶ 1, 4 (Jan. 30,
1957).
41. G.A. Res. 1004 (ES-II), ¶ 5 (Nov. 4, 1956).
42. Id. ¶ 6.
43. U.N. Secretary-General, Aide-memoire dated Nov. 8, 1956 from the SecretaryGeneral addressed to the Minister for Foreign affairs of Hungary, U.N. Doc. A/3315 (Nov.
8, 1956).
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“cooperate fully.”44 In a hardening of language in response to Soviet
recalcitrance, the Assembly then made a specific “request” in
Resolution 1130 (XI) (1956) that the Soviet Union “communicate
to the Secretary-General, not later than 7 December 1956, their
consent to receive United Nations observers.”45 The tone of this
resolution, in setting a deadline and carrying an expectation of
compliance, departed from Assembly practice up to that point,
prompting Members to request a vote specifically on this
paragraph.46 The deadline paragraph also caught the attention of
the international media; the New York Times indicated that more
drastic measures would be taken if not met.47
What these drastic measures might be, and the basis for
imposing them, was left vague in the General Assembly. In the
explanations of vote on Resolution 1130 (XI) (1956), the major
powers avoided any specific threats.48 The more interesting
observations on the legal foundation of a cooperation duty, even if
rather elliptical, were made from the smaller powers. Uruguay
considered it “undeniable that this world parliament possesses full
authority to cross the borders of any Member State for the purpose
of finding out whether or not crimes have been committed against
international law and order.”49 A permutation of this argument
was that granting entrance to an Assembly-mandated inquiry was
obligatory. India, too, suggested there to be some duty to accept the
presence of an inquiry, but stated this as “not a legal, but a moral
duty.”50 The Dominican Republic asserted that the Soviet Union
was both “legally and morally” bound to cooperate.51 China
regarded the Secretary-General’s entrance into Hungary to
conduct an inquiry as “a part of the minimum obligations of the

44. G.A. Res. 1006 (ES-II), ¶ 3 (Nov. 9, 1956) (“Urges” the Soviet Union to “cooperate
fully”); see also 571st plen. mtg., supra note 9, at ¶ 150 (“It is only after the observers have
gone in, if they do go there-and that must be at the express wish of the Government of the
country.”).
45. G.A. Res. 1130 (XI), ¶ 2 (Dec. 4, 1956).
46. U.N. GAOR, 11th Sess., 608th plen. mtg. at 526, A/PV.608 (Dec. 4, 1956). This vote
passed with 44 votes to 13, with 13 abstentions. Id.
47. Id. ¶ 43.
48. Nonetheless, the Soviet Union said that it would not be intimidated into
cooperation with “blackmail and threats.” Id. ¶ 43.
49. Id. ¶ 75.
50. Id. ¶ 107.
51. Id. ¶ 229.
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United Nations towards the Hungarian people.”52 In focusing on
the consequence of non-cooperation, Nepal also observed that the
Soviet Union’s failure to “comply” with Assembly resolutions
“shows their lack of faith and trust in the Purposes and Principles
of the Charter.”53 India, similarly, felt Soviet recalcitrance was a
“lack of courtesy” and a “violation of the spirit of the Charter.”54
This alludes to, as the next section demonstrates, a requirement to
cooperate as tied to a duty to act in good faith under the UN
Charter. It was not a point taken, however, by other Members nor
incorporated into the text of any of the resolutions.
The Soviet Union indicated that it would not be intimidated by
the “blackmail and threats” contained in Resolution 1130 (XI)
(1956); not buckling to pressure, the deadline to cooperate
expired.55 None of the suggested coercive action threatened by the
General Assembly was taken. Soviet non-cooperation was only
noted in a subsequent resolution to evoke a “grave concern,”
whereas the denial of the exercise of fundamental rights of
Hungarians, on the other hand, was condemned as a “violation of
the Charter.”56 The Secretary-General, lamenting the Soviet’s lack
of cooperation, in turn recommended the Assembly establish an
inquiry to facilitate “the consideration of matters relating to
Hungary that went beyond what could be achieved through an
investigation of the kind with which the Secretary-General has
been charged.”57 That said, the Assembly’s subsequent
establishment in Resolution 1132 (XI) (1957) of an inquiry to
investigate the “situation created” by Soviet intervention was also
accompanied by the weaker “call” for the Soviets to cooperate.58 In
the explanation of the vote, there was little consideration on the
imperatives of cooperation, perhaps surprising given the failed
attempts to secure the Secretary-General’s access into Hungary
previously. That said, Indonesia indicated its preference that the
resolution use the word “requests” rather than “calls upon,” the
implication being that “requests” carries with it a greater
52. Id. ¶ 28.
53. Id. ¶ 92.
54. Id. ¶ 108.
55. Id. ¶ 43.
56. G.A. Res. 1131 (XI), pmbl., ¶ 2 (Dec. 4, 1956).
57. U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General, ¶ 9 U.N. Doc. A/3485 (Jan.
5, 1957).
58. G.A. Res. 1132 (XI), ¶ 2 (Jan, 10, 1957).
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expectation of cooperation.59 However, this suggestion was not
heeded. Finally, by way of a conclusion on the Hungary situation,
the inquiry’s publication of the report was later endorsed by the
Assembly; Resolution 1133 (XI) (1957), which “regretted” that the
Soviet Union and Hungary “have failed to co-operate in any way
with the Committee,” once again did not spell out the legal
consequences arising from non-cooperation.60 This early example
neatly illustrated a general timidity of the Assembly both in
framing cooperation in strong terms and in confronting noncooperation, features that would remain present in many later
situations even less politically charged as one involving a
superpower.
One area where the General Assembly has been more willing
to confront non-cooperation in stronger terms is with inquiries
established to investigate situations in colonial territories. These
inquires have typically been concerned with reporting on the
preparedness for independence of these territories and the actions
of a colonial power against peoples under their mandate. Here
there appears to be a stronger expectation of cooperation on the
mandate holder, including to allow it access into the mandated
territory. After the assassination of the Prime Minister of Burundi
in 1961, the Assembly “request[ed]” an inquiry to visit the scene
immediately, and the colonial Belgian authorities gave their
cooperation.61 In 1962, the Assembly “deplor[ed]” Portugal’s
failure to cooperate with a subcommittee it established to look into
“recent disturbances and conflicts in Angola.”62 Resolution 1742
(XVI) (1962) went further in requesting Member States “to use
their influence to secure the compliance of Portugal with the
present resolution.”63 This alludes to the possibility of Members
exerting pressure through the imposition of sanctions as a means
59. U.N. GAOR, 11th Sess., 636th plen. mtg., ¶ 107, U.N. Doc. A/PV.636 (Jan. 10, 1957).
60. G.A. Res. 1133 (XI), pmbl. (Sept. 11, 1957); see also U.N. GAOR, 11th Sess., 677th
plen. mtg., ¶ 80, U.N. Doc., A/PV.677 (Sep. 13, 1957). In the following session, the GA also
“deplored” the Soviet Union’s refusal to cooperate. G.A. Res. 1312 (XIII), ¶ 3 (Dec. 12,
1958).
61. G.A. Res. 1627 (XVI), ¶ 2 (Oct. 23, 1961); see also U.N. Comm’n, Question of the
future of Ruanda-Urundi: Rep. of the U.N. Comm’n for Ruanda-Urundi on the assassination
of the Prime Minister of Burundi, ¶¶ 17-19, U.N. Doc. A/5086 (Jan. 26, 1961).
62. G.A. Res. 1603 (XV), pmbl. (Apr. 20, 1961); see also G.A. Res. 1742 (XVI), pmbl.
(Jan. 30, 1962).
63. G.A. Res. 1742 (XVI), ¶ 7 (Jan. 30, 1962); see also G.A. Res. 1807 (XVII), ¶ 8 (Dec.
14, 1962).
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to secure compliance and cooperation.64 The Assembly in a later
resolution also “reminded” Portugal that its non-compliance with
UN resolutions is “inconsistent with its membership.”65 The
implication here is that cooperation is intrinsic to UN membership,
although the Assembly did not focus specifically on noncooperation as being the offending conduct but a general noncompliance with UN resolutions on matters that included
cooperation. Either way, the Assembly’s campaign to exert
pressure had traction; Portugal agreed to allow the sub-committee
access into Angola.66 By contrast, condemnation of failures to
comply with “repeated resolutions” of the Assembly and Security
Council, which included calls for cooperation, did not meet with the
same success in South Africa.67
Some inquires were established with the consent of the State
concerned. Where cooperation has been forthcoming from the
outset of an inquiry, it has sometimes been welcomed and praised
as a voluntary act of good faith. In 1963, upon reports surfacing of
human rights abuses in South Vietnam, the government welcomed
a delegation to enter the territory and conduct investigations. The
government, however, was adamant that it be publicly known that
the inquiry had not been “imposed” but rather was “invited,”
something which the inquiry chairman readily acknowledged.68 As
the Vietnamese Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs noted,
Vietnam could not “have furnished better proof of its goodwill and
good faith than by thus allowing [the inquiry] complete liberty to
obtain information by all available means.”69 Treating cooperation
64. More generally, where the General Assembly has recommended sanctions for
violations of international obligations these have not mentioned specifically a failure to
cooperate with UN organs: G.A. Res. 41/35(B), ¶ 7 (Nov. 10, 1986); see also G.A. Res.
37/184, ¶ 5 (Dec. 17, 1982); G.A. Res. 34/93(A), ¶ 12 (Dec. 12, 1979); G.A. Res. 2107 (XX),
¶ 7 (Dec. 21, 1965); G.A. Res. 500 (V), ¶ 1 (May 18, 1951); G.A. Res. 39(1) (Dec. 12, 1946).
That said, some resolutions link recommended sanctions to a failure to implement General
Assembly resolutions, which impliedly includes a failure to cooperate. G.A. Res. 40/168
(A), ¶¶ 7, 13, 14 (Dec. 16, 1985).
65. G.A. Res. 1819 (XVII), ¶ 8 (Dec. 18, 1962).
66. U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., 1196th plen. mtg. at 1167-68, U.N. Doc. A/PV.1196 (Dec.
18, 1962).
67. G.A. Res. 1881 (XVIII), ¶ 1 (Dec. 17, 1963); see also G.A. Res. 1761 (XVII), ¶ 6 (Nov.
6, 1962).
68. Rep. of the U.N. Fact-Finding Mission to South Vietnam of Its Eighteenth Session,
U.N. Doc. A/5630, ¶ 30 (Dec. 7, 1963) [hereinafter South Vietnam Report].
69. Aide-memoire dated 28 October 1963 from the Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs to the Chairman of the Mission. Id. at 81. The government also then invited the UN

488

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 45:3

as a tool of diplomacy rather than law therefore could be seen as
offering greater incentive to a country to participate on the basis
that it would be instrumental to a public narrative of their
voluntary openness and transparency.70
By the late 1960s, alongside the passage and commencement
of international human rights treaties, there was a growing
perception that the international community needed to support
the development of an international system of human rights
protection. However, this did not translate into the distillation of a
clear principle that linked the promotion of human rights with an
obligation to cooperate with UN inquiries. The 1968 International
Conference of Human Rights, convened to consider ways to
strengthen human rights, did not lead to any specific recognition of
the need to cooperate with UN atrocity inquiries, except for a
general acknowledgment that it was the “obligation of the
international community to co-operate in eradicating” massive
denials of human rights.71 Assembly resolutions, including most
notably a 1973 declaration on cooperation for atrocity crimes,72
focused more specifically on the duty of states to cooperate with
one another to prosecute suspects of international crimes rather
acknowledging any vertical obligation to cooperate with UN
organs in this regard.73
The 1970s and 1980s continued to show inconsistency in the
General Assembly’s framing of cooperation with inquiries. In 1973,
following reports of a “massacre” in Mozambique, the Assembly
established an atrocity inquiry “to carry out an investigation,” and
stressed that the Portuguese colonial authorities “must allow a
to attend “in order that they may find out for themselves the true situation regarding the
relations between the Government and the Viet-Namese Buddhist community”: U.N. GAOR,
18th Sess., 1232nd plen. mtg. ¶ 93, U.N. Doc. A/PV.1232 (Oct. 7, 1963).
70. See also A/L.425 and add. 1, reproduced in South Vietnam Report, supra note 68,
¶ 93 (showing the draft resolution prepared by Chile and Costa Rica that took note of
Vietnam’s cooperation).
71. International Conference on Human Rights, Final Act of the International
Conference on Human Rights, art. 10, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.32/41 (May 13, 1968).
72. Principles of international co-operation in the detection, arrest, extradition and
punishment of persons guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Id.
73. G.A. Res. 3074 (XXVIII) ¶ 3 (Nov. 30, 1973). See also G.A. Res. 2840 (XXVI) ¶ 4
(Dec. 18, 1971) (“[R]efusal by States to co-operate in the arrest, extradition, trial and
punishment of persons guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity is contrary to the
purposes and principle of the Charter of the United Nations and to generally recognized
norms of international law.”).
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thorough and impartial investigation of the reported atrocities”
and “reques[ted]” them to cooperate with the inquiry.74 However,
Portugal’s failure to cooperate went without consequence; the
Assembly gave little attention to the alleged Mozambique
atrocities in later sessions, instead simply giving “appreciation” to
the inquiry report and commending all governments to take
“appropriate action” in line with the recommendations.75 In the
non-colonial context, the language concerning cooperation was
inconsistent in Assembly resolutions during this period. The
Assembly “deplored” or “regretted” the persistent noncooperation of Member States with inquiries into situations in
Chile, Afghanistan, and Iran.76 However, there was no suggestion
that cooperation was a legal obligation, nor that the failure to
observe it was inconsistent with the UN Charter. In relation to
occupied territories, the Assembly repeatedly “demand[ed]” that
Israel allow access to an inquiry, although, again, the legal
significance of this phrasing was left ambiguous.77 Still, in other
situations, the Assembly merely exhorted the membership to
cooperate (“calls upon”).78 Although prominent jurist Theo van
Boven noted in 1987 that there appeared to be a “growing legal
opinion” that states are obliged to “cooperate in procedures
applicable to humanitarian issues and human rights law,” the basis
for an obligation in relation to UN inquiries could not be clearly
seen in Assembly resolutions or accompanying explanations of
vote.79 Nor was such duty present in the Assembly’s 1991 FactFinding Declaration, which affirmed the voluntariness of state
cooperation; the sending of a UN mission “to the territory of any
State requires the prior consent of that State, subject to the
relevant provisions of the Charter.”80
74. G.A. Res. 3114 (XXVIII), at 97-98, pmbl., ¶ 3 (1973).
75. U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., at 117, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (Sept. 17- Dec. 18, 1974); U.N.
GAOR, 29th Sess., 2318th plen. mtg. at 1453, U.N. Doc. A/PV.2318 (Dec. 13, 1974).
76. G.A. Res. 31/124, ¶ 3 (Dec. 16, 1976); see also G.A. Res. 41/158, at 206 (Dec. 4,
1986); G.A. Res. 41/159, at 207 (Dec. 4, 1986).
77. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 42/160 (D), ¶ 3 (Dec. 8, 1987) (Special Committee on Israel);
see also G.A. Res. 33/113 (C), ¶ 2 (Dec. 18, 1978) (“Deplores the continued refusal by Israel
to allow the Special Committee access to the occupied territories”).
78. G.A. Res. 33/172, ¶ 2 (Dec. 20, 1978).
79. Theo van Boven, Duty of States to Cooperate, 5 Mennesker og Rettigheter 8, 9
(1987).
80. G.A. Res. 46/59, ¶ 6 (Dec. 9, 1991). See also G.A., 67th mtg., 46th Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/46/PV.67, at 42 (Dec. 9, 1991) (“prior consent . . . implies that the State has the right to

490

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 45:3

Since the 1990s there has been a perceptible rise in the
number of inquiries established to investigate atrocities, initially in
the Security Council and at an increased pace by the Human Rights
Council from 2007 onward. The Security Council has, acting under
Chapter VII, sometimes made cooperation mandatory, formulating
this imperative as a “demand.”81 This has led the General Assembly
to mirror the Security Council’s mandatory language on the same
situation, as it did in Resolution 49/205 (1995), demanding that
“immediate and unimpeded access be granted” to various UN
investigators.82 That said, the Assembly has used the same
ostensibly mandatory language (“demand”) to describe
cooperation with various non-Chapter VII inquiries, or strongly
condemned non-cooperation in a manner that implies there to be
an expectation of compliance.83 The Assembly has thus
consistently “demanded” Syria to grant access to inquiries.84 It has
also used instances of reengaged cooperation to support its
decisions, as it did in readmitting Libya to membership of the
Human Rights Council.85 In relation to the Israeli occupation, since
determine in advance and explicitly the terms and conditions for entry into, stay in and
withdrawal from its territory of fact-finding missions, subject to the relevant provisions of
the Charter”.)
81. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 941, ¶ 5 (Sept. 23, 1994) (“Demands that the Bosnian Serb party
accord immediate and unimpeded access for the Special Representative of the SecretaryGeneral, UNPROFOR, UNHCR and ICRC to Banja Luka, Bijeljina and other areas of
concern”); see also G.A. Res. 49/196, ¶ 5 (Mar. 10, 1995) (“Condemns” the continued
refusal to permit an inquiry in the territory).
82. G.A. Res. 49/204, ¶ 4 (Mar. 13, 1995); see also G.A. Res. 50/200, ¶ 8 (Mar. 11,
1996); G.A. Res. 54/184, ¶ 6 (Feb. 29, 2000) (each evidence of a demand to cooperate with
the ad hoc tribunals).
83. G.A. Res. 49/204, ¶ 4 (Mar. 13, 1995); see also G.A. Res. 49/198, ¶ 12 (Mar. 13,
1995); G.A. Res. 53/160, ¶ 14 (Feb. 9, 1999) (‘Regrets the lack of cooperation’ of the DRC);
G.A. Res. 62/169, ¶ 3 (Mar. 20, 2008) (“insists” that the government “cooperate fully”);
Human Rts. Comm., Res. 29/18, at 4 (July 2, 2015); Human Rts. Comm., Res. 26/24, ¶ 2
(July 14, 2014); Human Rts. Comm., Res. 19/17, at 2 (April 10, 2012).
84. G.A. Res. 74/169, ¶ 27 (Dec. 18, 2019); see also G.A. Res. 73/182, ¶ 23 (Dec. 17,
2018); G.A. Res. 72/191, ¶ 26 (Dec. 19, 2017); G.A. Res. 71/203, ¶ 22 (Dec. 19, 2016); G.A.
Res. 70/234, ¶ 12 (Dec. 23, 2015); G.A. Res. 69/189, ¶ 10 (Dec. 18, 2014); G.A. Res. 68/182,
¶ 8 (Dec. 18, 2013); G.A. Res. 67/262, at 2, ¶ 7 (May 15, 2013); G.A. Res. 67/183, ¶ 7 (Dec.
20, 2012); G.A. Res. 66/253 B, ¶ 10 (Aug. 3, 2012); G.A. Res. 66/253, ¶ 3 (Feb. 16, 2012);
G.A. Res. 66/176, ¶ 5 (Dec. 19, 2011).
85. In reaching that decision, the General Assembly emphasized:
“[T]he commitments made by Libya to uphold its obligations under international
human rights law, to promote and protect human rights, democracy and the rule
of law, and to cooperate with relevant international human rights mechanisms,
as well as the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
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2000 the Assembly has tied the demand to cooperate with an
inquiry to an underlying legal obligation in the UN Charter: Israel’s
need to cooperate was “in accordance with its obligations as a State
Member of the United Nations.”86 However, this is an isolated
example; resolutions in other situations demanding cooperation
have not explained the legal significance of such request. Nor,
despite noting the gravest forms of violations of international law,
including the possible occurrence of genocide, did the Assembly
use these opportunities to explicate upon a duty to cooperate.87
Furthermore, as with prior periods analyzed above, for all the
resolutions that sought to frame cooperation in ostensibly
mandatory terms there are many others that imply voluntariness,
using terms such as “call upon,” “encourage,” “urge,” or “strongly
urge” Members to cooperate.88
Nor, in recent years, have states advanced so clearly an
interpretive claim in UN forums that cooperation with inquiries is
mandatory. Opponents, in fact, have resisted the strengthening of
language in Assembly resolutions. Russia thus remarked in 2019
that “confrontation keeps building every year” in country specific
resolutions, including Syrian resolutions.89 Most of these
objections have focused on a putative legitimacy deficit in countryspecific resolutions, either on the basis that the General Assembly
or Human Rights Council should avoid pronouncing on issues
within the domestic affairs of a state, or otherwise should act with
political impartiality in the selection of situations.90 Challenges to
the legitimacy of findings of particular commissions has also been

and the International Commission of Inquiry established by the Human Rights
Council in its resolution S-15/1 of 25 February 2011” G.A. Res. 66/11 (Nov. 18,
2011).
86. G.A. Res. 72/84, ¶ 2 (Dec. 7, 2017) (Special Committee on Israel).
87. G.A. Res. 74/246, ¶ 4 (Dec. 27, 2019); see also G.A. Res. 73/264, ¶¶ 1, 8 (Dec. 22,
2018).
88. G.A. Res. 74/177, ¶ 17 (Dec. 18, 2019); see also G.A. Res. 70/233, ¶ 18 (2015); G.A.
Res. 71/205, ¶ 4 (2016); GA Res 71/202, ¶ 14 (2016). See, e.g., Human Rts. Couns. Res.
42/26, ¶ 23 (2019); Human Rts. Couns. Res. 34/25, ¶ 14 (2017); Human Rts. Couns. Res.
31/20, ¶ 17 (2016); Human Rts. Couns. Res. 29/18, ¶ 12 (2015); Human Rts. Couns. Res.
25/1, ¶ 9 (2014).
89. G.A., 74th Sess., 50th plen. mtg., A/74/PV.50 at 27 (Dec. 18, 2019). See also G.A.,
73rd Sess., 56th plen. mtg., A/73/PV.56 at 5 (Dec. 17, 2018) (rejecting this “exertion of
pressure on other countries under the pretense of human rights”).
90. See, e.g., G.A., 71st Sess., 66th plen. mtg., A/71/PV.66 at 25 (Dec. 21, 2016); see
also G.A. 37th Sess., 110th plen. mtg., A/37/PV.110 at 1800 (Dec. 17, 1982).
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cited as a reason for withholding cooperation.91 Eritrea thus
refused entry to an inquiry on the basis that it was lacking a valid
creation based upon the consent of the territorial state
concerned.92 The implication here is that cooperation is a
voluntary endeavour which will be predicated on the inquiry
enjoying political legitimacy. Other noteworthy state practice can
be seen from the application for provisional measures in The
Gambia v Myanmar.93 The Gambia sought an interim order that
would have required Myanmar to cooperate and grant access to all
UN inquiries engaged in investigating alleged genocidal acts
against the Rohingya.94 Although the ICJ did not grant that
particular order, The Gambia, and members of the Organization of
Islamic Cooperation whom it represented in the case against
Myanmar, seemed to accept that no duty to cooperate with UN
inquiries exists, thereby necessitating the ICJ order.95
Finally, there is general lack of recognition of a cooperation
duty in inquiry reports. It is common for them to include
cooperation in their list of recommendations, the implication being
that this is voluntary.96 Reports have not generally addressed the
legal implications of recalcitrance; at best they tend to express
their “regret” or outline the exhaustive yet unsuccessful steps that
91. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel will not cooperate with UNHRC
investigative
committee,
Nov.
13,
2014,
http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/2014/Pages/Israel-will-not-cooperate-with-UNHRCinvestigative- committee-13-Nov-2014.aspx [https://perma.cc/ALW6-FX5V] (“Given that
the Schabas committee is not a commission of inquiry but rather a committee of foregone
conclusions pretending to conduct an investigation before publishing its conclusions and
following consultations among the relevant people, the government has decided Israel will
not cooperate…” (emphasis added)).
92. OHCHR, Human Rights Council holds interactive dialogue with the Special
Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Eritrea, June 24, 2015,
https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=16136&Lan
gID=E [https://perma.cc/QP4H-5SM2].
93. Genocide (The Gambia v Myanmar) (Provisional Measures) (ICJ, Jan. 23, 2020).
94. Genocide Convention (The Gambia v Myanmar), Verbatim Record, Dec. 10, 2019,
at 71 https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/178/178-20191210-ORA-01-00BI.pdf [https://perma.cc/U7SX-YN5L].
95. Id.
96. Eritrea Report, supra note 8, ¶ 95; but see Human Rts. Couns., Rep. of the United
Nations Independent Investigation on Burundi (UNIIB), U.N. Doc. S-24/1, A/HRC/33/37,
¶ 146 (Sep. 20, 2016) (“The Government of Burundi must cooperate with the international
human rights system, including treaty bodies such as the Committee against Torture. It
should also cooperate with efforts to monitor the human rights situation on the ground.”)
(emphasis added); G.A., U.N. Doc. A/74/699, ¶ 48 (Feb. 13, 2020).
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UN bodies have taken to secure states’ cooperation.97 One notable
exception is the inquiry established for the situation in the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). The 2014 final
report considered that the DPRK’s “open defiance of the United
Nations” in refusing to cooperate with the inquiry “makes this a
case where decisive, yet carefully targeted action should be taken
by the Security Council in support of the ongoing efforts of the
remainder of the United Nations system.”98 This view implies that
the failure to cooperate with a UN inquiry threatens international
peace and security, if the “action” referred to in the report is
intended to mean Security Council enforcement action under
Chapter VII. It also rested on a putative duty of States to cooperate
“to bring to an end through lawful means any breach of
peremptory international law.”99 Still, neither the General
Assembly nor the Human Rights Council, which both endorsed the

97. Human Rts. Comm., Rep. of the independent international fact- finding mission to
investigate the implications of the Israeli settlements on the civil, political, economic, social
and cultural rights of the Palestinian people throughout the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, including East Jerusalem, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/22/63 (Feb. 7, 2013) (“The
mission had expected to undertake field visits to Israel and the Occupied Palestinian
Territory in order to observe directly the situation on the ground. It addressed five
requests for cooperation to the Government of Israel through the Permanent Mission of
Israel in Geneva. The Government did not respond to the mission’s requests. The mission
regrets the fact that the Government did not respond and that, consequently, it did not
have access to Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory.”); DPRK Rep., supra note 10,
¶ 21(“In a letter dated 10 May 2013, the DPRK directly conveyed to the President of the
Human Rights Council that it ‘totally and categorically rejects the Commission of Inquiry’.
Regrettably, this stance has remained unchanged, despite numerous efforts by the
Commission to engage the DPRK.”); Human Rts. Comm., Rep. of the OHCHR Investigation
on Sri Lanka (OISL), ¶¶ 36-40, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/30/CRP.2 (Sept. 16, 2015) (“The greatest
obstacle to OISL work was the absence of cooperation and undermining of the
investigation by the former Government…[T]he new Government did not cooperate
directly with OISL, its position on access to the country did not change, and it did not
respond officially to a letter sent on 15 March reiterating a request for information.”);
Human Rts. Comm., Rep. of the independent international commission of inquiry on the
Syrian Arab Republic, U.N.Doc. A/HRC/19/69, at 4 (Feb. 22, 2012) (“The commission
regrets that the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic did not give the commission
access to the country, nor did it respond positively to its requests to interview authorized
Government spokespersons.”).
98. DPRK Rep., supra note 10, ¶ 1208.
99. Id. ¶ 1672. See also Human Rts. Comm., Detailed findings of the Independent
International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, A/HRC/42/CRP .5, ¶¶ 52-55 (Sept. 16,
2019).
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report, sought to elucidate a legal requirement to cooperate with
inquiries beyond a rebuke for its non-occurrence.100
III. CONSTRUCTING A LEGAL DUTY TO COOPERATE WITH UN
INQUIRIES
Accordingly, there is a lack of practice in the General Assembly
to support a legal duty under the UN Charter to cooperate with
atrocity inquiries, absent a decision of the Security Council.
Nonetheless, it remains useful to consider a potential basis in the
UN Charter and general international law from which such an
obligation could be constructed. Although some of the following
analysis is lex ferenda, it nonetheless provides a reasonable basis
for future Charter-based interpretive claims to be made by the UN
membership. It examines the possibility of fashioning a duty to
cooperate from the text of the UN Charter and considers the extent
to which such a duty is supported by the principle of good faith.
Beyond the UN Charter, atrocity inquiry reports, as already alluded
to, have referenced a duty to cooperate in other instruments or
customary international law.101 There is potential for the Assembly
to thus confirm such an understanding of international law to give
more specificity to this cooperation duty.
A.

Cooperation under the UN Charter

Cooperation is an organizing concept of the UN Charter.
Article 1 explicates that two purposes of the UN are to “achieve
international cooperation in solving international problems of an
economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character,” and to be a
“centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of
these common ends.”102 Pursuant to Article 56, “[a]ll Members
pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co-operation
with the Organization” to achieve a myriad of human rights and
socio-economic purposes set out in Article 55.103 Pursuant to

100. G.A. Res. 69/188, pmbl., ¶ 2 (2014) (“very serious concern” at non-cooperation);
Human Rts. Comm., Res. 25/25, at pmbl., 2 (2014) (“deeply regretting” the refusal to
cooperate).
101. See discussion supra note 99.
102. U.N. Charter art. 1.
103. U.N. Charter art. 55-56.
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Article 2(5), moreover, a requirement to lend “every assistance”
also arises where “action” is taken.104
1. Duty to Lend “Every Assistance”
Of these provisions, Article 2(5) provides the clearest textual
basis in which to frame a cooperation duty where an inquiry is
established. It provides that “[a]ll Members shall give the United
Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with
the present Charter.”105 This language of the provision is what
represents a positive obligation, which is followed by a negative
duty upon States to “refrain from giving assistance to any State
against which the United Nations is taking preventive or
enforcement action.”106 The interpretive claim here would be that
“any action” denotes the creation of an atrocity inquiry by a
competent UN organ, with “every assistance” entailing a
requirement to cooperate with this inquiry in a manner that would
entail granting it the necessary access and support for it to conduct
an effective investigation. The ICJ in the Reparation for Injuries
Advisory Opinion indicated that “every assistance” was a
commitment to be “strictly observed” so as to ensure the “effective
working of the Organization.”107 The ICJ made these comments in
the context of explaining the UN’s legal personality: “it must be
noted that the effective working of the Organization—the
accomplishment of its task, and the independence and
effectiveness of the work of its agents—require that these
undertakings should be strictly observed.”108
However, there is nothing in the drafting history nor in
established UN practice to support the proposition that Article
2(5) generates such a general duty to cooperate with UN atrocity
inquiries. The drafting conferences provide scant guidance; the
drafting history only references two unsuccessful amendment
proposals, both concerning the implications of the duty to lend
every assistance to UN military campaigns on the neutrality of

104. U.N. Charter art. 2(5).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory
Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 174, 183 (April 11, 1949).
108. Id.
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states.109 Furthermore, Article 2(5) had no predecessor in the
Covenant of the League of Nations from which guidance could be
drawn. Article 2(5) has also been neglected in UN practice, as it is
seldom featured in principal organs’ resolutions.110 Security
Council resolutions have not expressly invoked the provision,
although it has sometimes used identical or similar phrases.111
Some Security Council members have referenced Article 2(5) to
underline the need for recalcitrant states to observe Council
resolutions, although this has not been widespread.112 The General
Assembly has never grounded cooperation with an atrocity inquiry
in the text of Article 2(5), although a draft resolution has generally
alluded to the provision in a preambulatory clause, seemingly to
merely underline the solidarity between the organization and its
membership, in the different context of a proposal to reform the
Security Council.113 The final report of the High-level Panel on UN
Peace Operations (the “Brahimi Report” as it is commonly
referred) indicated that there is an expectation that Members give
“every assistance” under Article 2(5) to inquiries established by
the Secretary-General; the same can be said for Assembly or
Human Rights Council inquiries.114 The qualification here is that no
other atrocity inquiry report has invoked Article 2(5) in this way.
The lack of practice might be used to weaken an interpretive
claim that there is a general duty to cooperate with an atrocity
inquiry under Article 2(5), but equally, the structure of this
provision, and its place within the scheme of the UN Charter, could
also support the plausibility of this interpretive claim. A narrow
view is that Article 2(5) only denotes Security Council
“enforcement action” under Chapter VII. However, Article 2(5)
differentiates forms of action, whereas the positive obligation to
render “every assistance” refers to “any action,” the negative duty
109. U.N. Conference of International Organization, U.N. Doc. 423, I/1/20 (Vol. VI),
312; U.N. Conference of International Organization, U.N. Doc. 739, I/1/19(a) (Vol. VI), 722.
110. See also supra Part II.
111. See, e.g., Helmut Philipp Aust, Ch.I Purposes and Principles, Article 2 (5), THE
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, VOL. 1, 239 (Bruno Simma and others, eds., 2012); S.C. Res.
82, ¶ 3 (June 25, 1950) (Korean crisis in 1950 where it called upon Member States “to
render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution”).
112. U.N. SCOR 27th Sess., 1632nd mtg., ¶ 28, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1632 (Feb. 1, 1972).
113. G.A. Draft Res., A/59/L.64 (July 6, 2005).
114. G.A., Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peacekeeping Operations
in all their Aspects, A/55/305-S/2000/809, ¶ 32 (Aug. 21, 2000).
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is to refrain from undermining UN “preventative or enforcement
action.”115 Article 2(5) is also contained in Chapter I of the UN
Charter, concerning the “Principles and Purposes,” and is not
specifically directed toward Security Council enforcement action.
It may be claimed that the different descriptions of action in Article
2(5) stem from a drafting aberration, and that enforcement action
is what “any action” really means. But, as the ICJ has noted, albeit
in a different context of delineating permissible budgetary matters,
the drafters were aware of distinctions and knew how to employ
more restrictive meanings when necessary.116 The distinctions
drawn between different forms of “action” in Article 2(5) support
the imposition of duties on Member States to lend assistance to the
UN whenever it takes “any” action.
This begs the question over what “action” entails. Based upon
a literal meaning of the word, the Oxford English Dictionary defines
“action” as “something that is done.”117 In a sense, this would cover
a great variety of activities within the UN, but it is also clear that
“action” must be appreciated as an act that produces a particular
legal effect within the legal framework of the UN Charter for it to
be considered as “done.” This might lead to the conclusion that only
the Security Council can act, whether that be through enforcement
action or other types of action, given that only it (and the ICJ) has
the express power to bind the membership in the UN Charter. On
this reasoning, a General Assembly “recommendation” to
cooperate with an inquiry produces no legal effects and therefore
is not a form of action which triggers a duty under Article 2(5).
Although Assembly recommendations do not generally bind the
membership, this does not mean that they are incapable of
producing effects in particular spheres of institutional activity.
Indeed, the United States once held the view that the Assembly’s
termination of South Africa’s Mandate of South West Africa
constituted a form of “action” under Article 2(5):

115. U.N. Charter art. 2(5).
116. Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. Rep. 151,
159 (July 20, 1962) (“In the first place, concerning the word ‘budget’ in paragraph I of
Article 17, it is clear that the existence of the distinction between ‘administrative budgets’
and ‘operational budgets’ was not absent from the minds of the drafters of the Charter.”).
See also Sloan, CHANGING WORLD, supra note 19, at 23.
117. Action, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (X ed., 2010).
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We have accepted this conclusion because we agree that it is a
correct and authoritative statement of the existing obligations
of UN members under international law as a result of the
termination by the General Assembly of the South West Africa
mandate and the assumption by the UN of responsibility and
authority over Namibia. We did not consider that binding
resolutions were necessary to produce these obligations, for
we believed that they flowed directly from the Charter,
particularly Article 2, paragraph 5 which requires all members
to assist the United Nations in any action it takes in accordance
with the Charter.118

This construction would support the notion that “action”
includes the discharge of functions under the UN Charter that are
connected to not only Security Council decisions but also primary
obligations under the UN Charter. According to the United States
(above), therefore, the General Assembly’s termination of the
mandate in turn produced an effect within the UN legal order that
required South Africa’s assistance to discharge it under Article
2(5). A similar mode of reasoning could be extended to the creation
of atrocity inquiries by the General Assembly or Human Rights
Council, particularly given the textual basis for their creation in
Article 22, which allows the Assembly to establish “such subsidiary
organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its
functions.”119 The creation of a subsidiary entity, a form of
implementation of its resolutions, can reasonably be construed as
“action” within the framework of the UN Charter. Indeed, some
support for this proposition is provided by the ICJ in Certain
Expenses, an Advisory Opinion from 1962 which delineated action
taken by the Assembly and Security Council.120 Whereas only the
Security Council could take “enforcement action,” the Assembly
could permissibly take “some kind of action” to maintain
international peace and security provided that it was not
118. International Organizations – Legal Effect of Acts, 1975, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES
PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, § 4, at 89. See also Namibia Advisory Opinion, supra note
17, ¶ 110.
119. U.N. Charter art. 22.
120. Certain Expenses Advisory Opinion, supra note 107, at 163. The issue turned on
whether the creation of the UNEF (a peacekeeping force), created by the Secretary-General
pursuant to authority granted by the General Assembly, constituted a valid “expenditure”
under the UN Charter. One of the issues, therefore, was whether the Assembly could take
“action” to establish a peacekeeping force that could be deployed to maintain peace and
security in different States.
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“coercive.”121 This was inferred from Article 14 of the UN Charter,
which permits the Assembly to “recommend measures for the
peaceful adjustment of any situation.”122 Here the ICJ equated
“measures” with “action.”123 As to what might constitute Assembly
action, the ICJ noted further:
[T]he implementation of its recommendations for setting up
commissions or other bodies involves organizational activity
– action - in connection with the maintenance of international
peace and security. Such implementation is a normal feature
of the functioning of the United Nations. Such committees,
commissions or other bodies or individuals, constitute, in
some cases, subsidiary organs established under the authority
of Article 22 of the Charter. The functions of the General
Assembly for which it may establish such subsidiary organs
include, for example, investigation, observation and
supervision, but the way in which such subsidiary organs are
utilized depends on the consent of the State or States
concerned.124

The ICJ’s emphasis on the basis for General Assembly action
as being derived from State consent would seem to preclude the
triggering of the cooperation duty in Article 2(5), this being the
antithesis of consent. However, this aspect of Certain Expenses is
open to reappraisal in light of contemporary practice. It may have
been that in 1962 the Assembly’s subsidiary organs were
predicated on consent; this no longer remains the case based upon
a long line of practice. To be sure, the peacekeeping mission
referenced in Certain Expenses entered the territory and the
consent of the relevant territorial state would still be necessary for
a non-Chapter VII peacekeeping force. However, atrocity inquiries
have commonly been established without the consent of the state
concerned. Furthermore, the ICJ did not consider the effect of
Article 2(5), nor did it have to as the peacekeeping mechanisms
established by the Assembly were all predicated on consent.125
Still, it is not suggested here that the Assembly could exercise a
coercive power like the Security Council, in the sense that it could

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 165 (emphasis added).
Id.
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authorize its atrocity inquiry to enter territory against the will of
the relevant state. The point, rather, is that the Assembly’s creation
of a subsidiary body in the implementation of a resolution is itself
a form of action which subsequently triggers a duty to cooperate
under Article 2(5). How this duty is enforced in the event of noncooperation is another matter.
A plausible interpretive claim can therefore be advanced by
Member States in the future where the General Assembly (and the
Human Rights Council, exercising delegated powers) takes
measures to implement resolutions through the creation of
subsidiary bodies. Article 2(5) would require Member States to
give “every assistance” to this body.126 Although there might be
some penumbra of doubt as to what “every assistance” might
entail, in the context of cooperation with an atrocity inquiry the
expectation would be that this includes unfettered access to
witnesses and territory, elements that have repeatedly featured in
UN practice over the last decade.127 While “every assistance”
therefore has a relatively clear meaning in relation to cooperation
with atrocity inquiries, it is also conceivable that the form of
cooperation will turn upon the text of a particular resolution; the
language will define the scope of such obligation on Member States
under Article 2(5). Where, for instance, the Assembly demands a
Member State to cooperate with an atrocity inquiry through the
production of specific information, this demand serves to define
the form of assistance that would be necessary for there to be
compliance with the “every assistance” duty in Article 2(5). In this
regard, the resolution, commanding the support of the general
membership, will be strong evidence as to the content of the Article
2(5) and the form in which it is discharged in a particular situation.
2. Good Faith
Even if Article 2(5) does not lend support to the interpretive
claim for a general duty to cooperate with UN atrocity inquiries,
there is arguably some existing duty for states to engage with
General Assembly recommendations dealing with cooperation. It
is trite that Assembly resolutions do not generally create a source
of obligation, except in relation to defined internal operational
126. For a comparable argument see Sloan, CHANGING WORLD, supra note 19, at 36.
127. See supra Section III.A.2 for consideration on this point.
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matters.128 Where the Assembly makes a “demand” to cooperate,
therefore, it must be read in light of this orthodoxy. However, it
presents an overly simplistic picture to assert that the non-binding
character of recommendations means that they can be ignored at
will. Rather, it is submitted, Member States are required to give a
good faith consideration to them and must account to the Assembly
where they refuse to cooperate. This principle finds roots in
domestic systems of administrative law, imposing requirements
on public authorities to take into account all relevant
considerations before making a decision and to furnish reasons.129
This administrative law concept shares the same normative root
with the “good faith” principle, being a general principle of treaty
interpretation.130 Article 2(2) of the UN Charter defines this duty
to apply to the fulfilment of “obligations assumed by them in
accordance with the present Charter.”131 It might be said that as
recommendations are not “obligations” there is no duty to act in
good faith in relation to them. But it is reasonable to consider the
good faith principle as applying to all aspects of the Member States’
relations with the UN, including in their consideration of Assembly
recommendations.
There is some practice to support this good faith principle. As
the Assembly noted in its Fact-Finding Declaration, States should
give “timely consideration” to any request for cooperation and
should “inform the organ of its decision without undue delay,”
“giving reasons for its decision” where it refuses to accede to the
request.132 Given that it was adopted by consensus and was
described as a “declaration,” these statements of principle reflect
an important legal expectation incumbent upon States in
128. See generally Sloan, CHANGING WORLD, supra note 19; Blaine Sloan, The Binding
Force of a Recommendation of the General Assembly of the United Nations, 25 BRITISH YBK
INT’L L. 1 (1948).
129. Margaret Young & Sebastian Sullivan, Evolution through the Duty to Cooperate:
Implications of the Whaling Case at the International Court of Justice, 16 MELBOURNE J. INT’L
L. 311, 338 (2015).
130. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, art. 26 (entered
into force Jan. 27, 1980); Mark Clodfelter, Do States Have a Duty to Cooperate in the
Interpretation of Investment Treaties, 108 AM. SOCIETY INT’L L. PROC. 188 (2014) (“perhaps
the most obvious source for a duty to cooperate on interpretation is found in Vienna
Convention Article 26’s prescription that ‘every treaty in force is binding upon the parties
to it and must be performed by them in good faith.’”).
131. U.N. Charter art. 2(2).
132. G.A. Res. 46/59, ¶ 19 (1991).
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circumstances where the Assembly calls for their cooperation.133
Judge Hersch Lauterpacht of the ICJ reinforced this point, albeit in
the context of the administration of trust territories: “[a]
Resolution recommending to an Administering State a specific
course of action creates some legal obligation which, however
rudimentary, elastic, and imperfect, is nevertheless a legal
obligation and constitutes a measure of supervision.”134 While a
state was not bound to accept the recommendation, it was “bound
to give it due consideration in good faith.”135 In turn, if a state
decides to disregard the recommendation, then “it is bound to
explain the reasons for its decision.”136 Similar reasoning is found
in the ICJ’s 2014 Whaling decision in the context of the
International Whaling Convention.137 Japan was under “an
obligation to give due regard to . . . recommendations” adopted by
the International Whaling Commission (“IWC”).138 The ICJ did not
explicate upon the basis of such a duty, except to note that Japan
accepted it and that it flowed from a “duty to co-operate.”139 Ad hoc
Judge Hilary Charlesworth particularly noted that IWC resolutions
“when adopted by consensus or a large majority vote . . . represent
an articulation of the shared interests at stake,” and parties are
“thus required to consider these resolutions in good faith.”140 In the
context of the UN Charter, the same can be said about Assembly
recommendations.

133. The use of the phrase “declaration” is intended to convey greater solemnity in
the expression of a principle of “great and lasting importance.” U.N. Office of Legal Affairs,
Memorandum on Use of the Terms “Declaration and Recommendation”, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/L.610, ¶ 3 (Apr. 2, 1962).
134. South West Africa Voting Procedure, Advisory Opinion, 1955 I.C.J. Rep. 67, 119
(Judge Lauterpacht).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 120; Young & Sullivan, supra note 129, at 328. See also Interpretation of
the Agreement between the WHO and Egypt, Advisory Opinion, 1980 I.C.J. Rep. 73, at 95,
97 (Dec. 20, 1980) (requirement to “consult together in good faith”); Fisheries Jurisdiction
(U.K. v. Ice.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 75 (duty to consult and negotiate “flows from
the very nature of the respective rights of the Parties” and this duty “corresponds to the
Principles and provisions of the Charter of the United Nations on peaceful settlement of
disputes”).
137. Whaling in the Antarctic (Austrl. v. Japan), Judgement, 2014 I.C.J. Rep. 226 (Mar.
31, 2014).
138. Id. at 269-70.
139. Id. at 257. The relevant provision at issue, art VIII of the Convention, was also
not so explicit.
140. Id., (separate opinion by Judge Charlesworth, J.), at 457.

2022]

U.N. ATROCITY INQUIRIES

503

Still, it might be queried whether the duty to act in good faith
is meaningful, particularly given that it imposes only what appears
to be a minimal requirement to consider a recommendation and to
give reasons where a state rejects it. Recalcitrant states, including
Myanmar, have been quite consistent in their reasons as to why
they reject Assembly recommendations to cooperate, alleging the
scrutiny to be politically biased and tainted.141 However, the
membership as a whole, acting through the Assembly, is the
ultimate judge as to whether the reasons given by a state evince a
good faith consideration of the recommendations to cooperate.142
This burden of explanation has featured in a line of Assembly
resolutions, as well as a determination as to whether such burden
was satisfactorily met.143 An early example arose in 1949, in
response to a concern that the Assembly had with respect to the
suppression of human rights in Bulgaria and Hungary.144 Similarly,
with regard to disappearances in Chile and Guatemala, the
Assembly “requested” these authorities to “clarify the fate” of those
who disappeared or were unaccounted for.145 It was more specific
in calling upon Iraq, in response to reports of disappearances of
Kuwaitis and other nationals, to provide “detailed information” on
all persons deported from or arrested in Kuwait, records of those
who were executed, as well as the location of their graves.146 It
“urged” Sudan to “explain without delay the circumstances of the
repeated air attacks on civilian targets in southern Sudan.”147 The
141. See e.g., U.N. GOAR, 74th Sess., 52nd plen. mtg., at 32, U.N. Doc. A/74/PV.52 (Dec.
19, 2019). Myanmar’s resistance to UN involvement in the Rohingya crisis is explored in
greater detail in Ramsden, Accountability, supra note 11, at 170.
142. The Assembly’s quasi-judicial competence, in making determinations based
upon a set of norms in a situation, is long recognized as established institutional practice
even if not always effectively utilized. Oscar Schachter, The Quasi-Judicial Role of the
Security Council and the General Assembly, 58(4) AM. J. INT’L L. 960 (1964); U.N. Conference
of International Organization (XIII) (1945); Ramsden, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, supra note
15, Ch. 4; Michael Ramsden & Tom Hamilton, “Uniting Against Impunity”: The UN General
Assembly as a Catalyst for Action at the ICC, 66 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 893, 902 (2017).
143. This burden of explanation has arisen in other areas. G.A. Res. 1536 (XV), ¶ 4
(1960) (on the administration of non-self-governing territories); G.A. Res. 1402 (XIV) (B),
¶ 4 (1959) (on outcome of nuclear disarmament negotiation).
144. G.A. Res. 385 (V), ¶ 4 (1950). These States provided no “satisfactory refutation”
of accusations. Id.
145. G.A. Res. 38/100, ¶ 6 (1983); G.A. Res. 37/183, ¶ 5 (1982). See also G.A. Res.
40/140, ¶ 6 (1985); G.A. Res. 33/175, ¶ 2 (1978).
146. G.A. Res. 49/203, ¶ 5 (1995).
147. G.A. Res. 49/198, ¶ 6 (1994).
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Assembly “requested” that Portugal submit a report to a
designated future session “on the measures it has undertaken in
the implementation of the present resolution.”148 It also
“demanded” that Israel inform the Secretary-General of the
“results of the investigations” with respect to political
assassination attempts.149
This practice supports the proposition, as part of the good
faith principle, that a state is under a burden to substantively
explain its conduct and to indicate what measures have been taken
to investigate matters that have caused alarm to the international
community. This is premised not on a specific duty to cooperate.
Rather, states, by virtue of membership in a multilateral treaty
organization established to foster cooperation, have the onus to
meaningfully participate to achieve the organization’s objectives.
Judging the instances in which a state, due to its failure to justify its
conduct, has acted in bad faith, will depend on the articulated
opinion of the membership. As explained above, Member States
have been especially pointed in their condemnation of States who
have displayed a persistent disregard of Assembly
recommendations to cooperate with atrocity inquiries.150 In this
regard, such persistent disregard can be understood as an act of
bad faith. Once again, dictum of the late Judge Lauterpacht is highly
perceptive, which describes bad faith of this nature as an abuse of
right: “[T]he cumulative effect of the persistent disregard of the
articulate opinion of the Organization is such as to foster the
conviction that the State in question has become guilty of disloyalty
to the Principles and Purposes of the Charter.”151 Accordingly, the
recalcitrant state “may find that it has overstepped the
imperceptible line between impropriety and illegality, between
discretion and arbitrariness, between the exercise of the legal right
to disregard the recommendation and the abuse of that right.”152

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

G.A. Res. 1742 (XVI), ¶ 9 (Jan. 30, 1962).
G.A. Res. 38/79 (H), ¶ 2 (Dec. 15, 1983).
See supra notes 76-77.
Voting Procedure, supra note 134, at 120.
Voting Procedure, supra note 134, at 120.
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Cooperation Duty under International Law

Outside of the UN Charter, a duty of cooperation might be
fashioned from specific treaty regimes or as a matter of customary
international law. The latter is currently lacking in a precisely
formulated duty to cooperate. However, as scholars have noted, a
duty to cooperate has been translated into more specific
commitments in particular areas of international law, including
international environmental law, the use of force, and
international economic law.153 In this regard, the sources of
international criminal law and international human rights law
might be used to provide a more particularized duty to cooperate
with UN atrocity inquiries.
In the fields of international criminal law, there are a number
of treaties that proscribe conduct and specify obligations to
prevent and punish the commission of atrocity crimes.154 Similarly,
the General Assembly’s Cooperation Principles declare that “States
shall assist each other in detecting, arresting and bringing to trial
persons suspected of having committed such crimes and, if they
are found guilty, in punishing them.”155 However, the basis of these
153. Wolfrum, supra note 3, ¶ 2 (noting that cooperation has no inherent value but
turns on the specified objective to be achieved in a legal regime) (citing, as an example,
G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV) (Oct. 24, 1970)) (adopting the Declaration on Principles of
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States); Philippe
Sands et al., PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 215-16 (Cambridge Univ.
Press, 2d ed., 2003) (illustrating how cooperation, including the principle of ‘good
neighborliness’, has been translated into rules of international environmental law).
154. See, e.g., International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the
Crime of Apartheid, art. 5, (entered into force July 18, 1976) 1015 U.N.T.S. 243, art. 5 (“The
States Parties to the present Convention undertake . . . (a) to adopt any legislative or other
measures necessary to suppress as well as to prevent any encouragement of the crime of
apartheid and similar segregationist policies or their manifestations and to punish persons
guilty of that crime”); International Convention against the Taking of Hostages (entered
into force Jun. 3, 1983), 1316 UNTS 205, art. 4:
States Parties shall co-operate in the prevention of the offences set forth in
article 1, particularly by: (a) Taking all practicable measures to prevent
preparations in their respective territories for the commission of . . . offences . . .
including measures to prohibit in their territories illegal activities of persons,
groups and organizations that encourage, instigate, organize or engage in the
perpetration of acts of taking of hostages.
G.A. Res. 39/46, art. 2, ¶ 1 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Dec. 10, 1984) (“Each State Party shall take effective
legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any
territory under its jurisdiction”).
155. G.A. Res. 3074 (XXVIII), ¶ 4 (Dec. 3, 1973).
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duties is often formulated as inter-state cooperation in the
prosecution or extradition of suspects; it does not clearly extend to
an explicit obligation to cooperate with international
organizations, let alone a particular form such as a UN atrocity
inquiry.156 Where cooperation with international organizations is
envisaged, this arises more as a power than a duty. For example,
Article VIII of the Genocide Convention provides that any
contracting party “may call” upon UN organs to take action.157 That
said, the UN exists as a means to give effect to common objectives,
which has increasingly come to include the coordination of
investigations into atrocity crimes. This coordination function is
particularly apparent with the General Assembly’s mechanism for
Syria, whose function is to prepare individual case files to support
future prosecutorial efforts, including at a national level.158 In this
respect it might be argued that states have entrusted upon the UN
the function of investigating international crimes on their behalf,
thereby supporting the claim that an inter-state cooperation duty
also extends to the relationship between states and the UN.
While there is no clear and explicit obligation in these
instruments to cooperate with UN atrocity inquiries, there is some
movement in this direction under the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), as seen in Human Rights
Committee General Comment No. 36, adopted in September
2019.159 The Committee observed that “States should support and
cooperate in good faith with international mechanisms of
investigation and prosecutions addressing possible violations of
article 6.”160 Article 6 of the ICCPR enshrines the right to life, which
156. See id. See also Rebecca Barber, Accountability for Crimes against the Rohingya:
Possibilities for the General Assembly where the Security Council Fails, 17(3) J. INT’L CRIM.
JUST. 557, 584 (2019) (surveying sources to discern a duty under customary international
law for states to cooperate with each other in the prosecution of war crimes; but not a
specific requirement, as such, to cooperate with atrocity inquiries).
157. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
(entered into force Jan. 12, 1951) 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
158. U.N. Secretary-General, Implementation of the Resolution Establishing the
International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law
Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011, ¶¶ 30-31, U.N. Doc. A/71/755
(Jan. 19, 2017).
159. Human Rts. Comm., General Comment No. 36, ¶ 28, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/36
(Sept. 3, 2019).
160. General comment No. 36, ¶ 28, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/36 (Sept. 3, 2019).
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includes a positive obligation to investigate possible violations of
this right which, according to the Human Rights Committee, might
extend to cooperation with international mechanisms.161 Although
“international mechanisms” is quite general, UN atrocity inquiries
are engaged in investigations; they could align their mandate so
that it covers alleged violations of Article 6 to engage directly with
the ICCPR. Indeed, many atrocity inquiries reports have applied
standards under the ICCPR.162 Although General Comments are not
legally binding, they are highly persuasive.163 General Comment
No. 36 therefore offers support for the future development of a
general cooperation duty with UN atrocity inquiries, at least where
the right to life is engaged under the ICCPR.
A duty to cooperate with a UN atrocity inquiry might therefore
derive from a particular treaty regime external to the UN. Still, it is
possible for the UN, specifically the General Assembly, to influence
the development of obligations in these distinct regimes. The
Assembly has regularly articulated and applied obligations from a
myriad of treaties, including, for example, the Geneva Conventions
and the Genocide Convention.164 To be sure, Assembly resolutions
remain formally non-binding, but they offer a rich source of
evidence as to the scope and content of international obligations,
whether they arise under the UN Charter, other multilateral treaty
regimes, or customary international law.165 Indeed, a recent report
of the International Law Commission (“ILC”) noted the capacity for
Assembly resolutions to constitute a “subsequent agreement” by
the treaty parties in the interpretation of a treaty.166 The ILC
161. Id.; Art. 6, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (entered into
force Mar. 23, 1976) 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
162. See, e.g., the extensive application of the ICCPR in DPRK Report, supra note 10.
163. Eckart Klein & David Kretzmer, The UN Human Rights Committee: The General
Comments - The Evolution of an Autonomous Monitoring Instrument, 58 GERMAN Y.B. INT’L
L. 189 (2015).
164. See e.g., G.A. Res. 55/116, ¶ 2(ii) (Mar. 12, 2021); G.A. Res. 53/164, ¶ 8 (Feb. 25,
1999); G.A. Res. 50/193, pmbl. (Mar. 11, 1996); G.A. Res. 49/198, ¶ 6 (Mar. 13, 1995); G.A.
Res. 40/161(D), pmbl., ¶ 5 (Dec. 16, 1985). Although see earlier objection to the Assembly
performing this interpretive role: U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., 108th plen. mtg., ¶ 121, U.N. Doc.
A/37/PV.108 (Dec. 16, 1982).
165. Higgins, DEVELOPMENT, supra note 26, at 5; Draft conclusions on subsequent
agreements, supra note 26, Conclusion 12(2).
166. Draft conclusions on subsequent agreements, supra note 26, at 111. See also
Whaling in the Antarctic, supra note 137, at 257; HENRY SCHERMERS & NIELS BLOKKER,
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW: UNITY WITHIN DIVERSITY 854 (2011) (General Assembly
interpretations on the constituent instruments of the Oil Pollution Compensation Fund);
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provided the examples of Assembly resolutions that endorsed
General Comments in the treaty regimes of the ICCPR and
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as
evidence of subsequent agreements.167 There might therefore be
some room for Assembly resolutions to articulate a general duty to
cooperate with UN atrocity inquiries in the future. It could start by
endorsing General Comment No. 36 as a statement of obligations
under Article 6 of the ICCPR.
A further basis in which to fashion a cooperation duty is by
locating this within the obligations to prevent atrocities, a view
alluded to in the DPRK inquiry final report.168 There are multiple
treaties that emphasize a duty of prevention.169 The ILC presented
the view that States might be under a duty to “cooperate to bring
to an end through lawful means any serious breach” of
international law.170 The ILC further acknowledged that
cooperation “could be organized in the framework of a competent
international organization, in particular the United Nations.”171 In
the finalized Draft Articles on Crimes Against Humanity, the ILC
incorporated a requirement on states to cooperate, to prevent
crimes against humanity, with “relevant intergovernmental
organizations.”172 The ILC chose the word “relevant” to indicate
that “cooperation with any particular intergovernmental
organization will depend, among other things, on the
organization’s functions and mandate, on the legal relationship of
the State to that organization, and on the context in which the need

NIGEL WHITE, THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM: TOWARD INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 38 (2002)
(Assembly resolutions adopted by consensus may be regarded as subsequent
agreements).
167. G.A. Res. 65/221, ¶ 5, n. 8 (Apr. 5, 2011) (referring to Human Rights Comm.
General Comment No. 29). See also G.A. Res. 70/169, pmbl. (Feb. 22, 2016) (recalling
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 15: The Right
to Water).
168. See DPRK Report, supra note 10, ¶ 1204 and associated text.
169. See supra note 154.
170. ILC, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts, with Commentaries, art. 41, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001). See also G.A. Res. 3074, ¶ 3
(1974) (“States shall co-operate with each other on a bilateral and multilateral basis with
a view to halting and preventing war crimes and crimes against humanity, and shall take
the domestic and international measures necessary for that purpose”).
171. Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States, supra note 170, ¶ 2.
172. Draft Articles on Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Humanity, with
Commentaries, art. 4, U.N. Doc. A/74/10 (2019).

2022]

U.N. ATROCITY INQUIRIES

509

for cooperation arises.”173 The premise here is that accountability
is a means to prevent future atrocities; given that international
investigations have been noted to serve a deterrent function this
connection can certainly be made.174 States could advance the
claim that this entails a duty to cooperate with a UN atrocity
inquiry as part of the prevention response. Indeed, most atrocity
inquiries have been established to address ongoing events and
have recommended measures to prevent the future occurrence of
atrocities.175
IV. CONCLUSION
Through an analysis of UN practice this Article has evaluated
the plausibility of the interpretive claim that there exists a legal
duty to cooperate with atrocity crime inquiries. It noted that
obtaining Member States’ cooperation, particularly from the
Member whose situation is under investigation, is perceived as
important for an atrocity inquiry to fulfil its mandate. Yet, while
there has been a trend toward the political organs establishing
inquiries against the wishes of relevant Member States, this has not
been accompanied with a general cognizance that cooperation
with such inquiries is mandatory within the UN system, outside of
a binding decision of the Security Council.
This is particularly evident in the practice of the General
Assembly in their monitoring of cooperation with atrocity
inquiries. It is trite that an Assembly recommendation is nonbinding, although this does not preclude the membership from
confirming their understanding, in a “declaration”, as to the
content of legal obligations under the UN Charter. Such
interpretation, where it commands general acceptance of the
membership, is evidence of a subsequent agreement or practice in
the interpretation of the UN Charter. However, it is apparent that
no such interpretive agreement on cooperation as a Charter
173. Id. at 61, ¶ 14.
174. Human Rts. Comm., Rep. of the Indep. Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, ¶ 141, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/28/69 (Feb. 5, 2015); U.N. GAOR, 77th Sess., 80th plen.
mtg., at 7, U.N. Doc. A/67/PV.80 (May 15, 2013); U.N. GAOR, 65th Sess., 76th plen. mtg., at
7, 5, U.N. Doc. A/65/PV.76 (Mar. 1, 2011).
175. DPRK Report, supra note 10, ¶ 1225 (“The United Nations should immediately
apply this strategy to help prevent the recurrence or continuation of crimes against
humanity in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.”).

510

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 45:3

obligation is present in Assembly resolutions practice. There is
some practice which might be used as a seed for a future
interpretive claim that a cooperation duty exists, particularly the
consistent iterations of “demands” in the Syria situation, and the
view that Israeli cooperation would be “in accordance with its
obligations as a State Member of the United Nations.” That is said,
however, with the caveat that there are many instances in which
cooperation is framed in voluntary terms, thereby undermining
the interpretive claim for a duty under the UN Charter as being
gleaned from current practice.
Still, there are potential bases in the UN Charter in which a
reasonable interpretive claim might be advanced by Member
States on the existence of a cooperation duty. Article 2(5), although
underutilized in UN resolutions practice, provides the closest
textual basis of a duty in its requirement that Members lend “every
assistance” where “action” is taken. Many read “action” here as
Chapter VII enforcement action, although the text also supports a
broader reading as including the creation of subsidiary organs by
the General Assembly (or Human Rights Council) to implement
their resolutions. A modest duty to cooperate with atrocity
inquiries might also be fashioned from the good faith principle
under the UN Charter, which requires Member States to openly
engage with the UN, including providing reasons where it rejects a
request for cooperation. While the good faith principle imposes a
rather minimal cooperation burden, it nonetheless provides an
additional hook in which to monitor Member States in their
relations with the UN on atrocity situations. Outside of the UN
Charter, there is some recognition of a requirement to cooperate
with relevant international processes, as the Human Rights
Committee recently noted. A cooperation duty might also be
conceived as concomitant of the duty to prevent atrocities and
State obligations to investigate and prosecute international crimes.
In the form of a “declaration,” it is open to the General Assembly to
confirm an understanding of the content and nature of these
obligations.
In the absence of Security Council action, it might be queried
whether these initiatives towards the recognition of a Charterbased cooperation duty are meaningful. A Security Council
decision requiring Member States to cooperate with an inquiry
report has behind it the threat of coercive action under Chapter VII.
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On this view, by contrast, the creation of inquiries by the General
Assembly or Human Rights Council advances a more limited
purpose of providing information to support these organs in
adopting non-binding recommendations. Nonetheless, the UN
Charter, as a treaty, imposes primary obligations on Member States
which might reasonably extend to a duty to cooperate with atrocity
inquiries, as concomitant of its growing mandate in advancing
accountability for international crimes and serious human rights
violations. The framing of this duty as a primary obligation in turn
provides an additional basis, in the General Assembly and other
forums, in which to condemn the recalcitrance of Member States,
thereby giving wider legal expression to the view that cooperation
accords “with its obligations as a State Member of the United
Nations.”
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